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Abstract
The process of European integration and policy-making is sometimes rather puzzling. On the one
hand, it is well documented that with respect to the implementation of European legislation
member states tend to do less than they are supposed to do. On the other hand, it is striking that
with respect to the implementation of the Council Directive 91/440 on the development of the
Community's railways many member states went far beyond the minimum required by the
European legislation. We argue that these differing evaluations of implementation success can be
traced to different implementation approaches, which may be termed the ‘compliance approach’
and the ‘support-building approach’. While the first is directed at prescribing domestic reforms
"from above", the latter aims at triggering European integration within the existing political context
at the national level. Here, successful implementation refers to the extent to which European
legislation triggers domestic changes by stimulating and strengthening support for European reform
ideas at the national level. In this respect, European legislation can influence the domestic arenas in
basically three ways: by providing legitimisation for political leadership, concepts for the solution
of national problems, and strategic constraints for domestic actors opposing domestic reforms.
Kurzfassung
Den Prozeß der europäischen Integration zu erklären, ist keine einfache Aufgabe. Dies gilt nicht nur
im Hinblick auf die Formulierung von Politiken, sondern auch für deren Implementation. Während
die Defizite bei der Implementation europäischer Vorgaben durch die Mitgliedstaaten fast schon
Legende sind, überrascht der Befund, daß viele Mitgliedstaaten bei der Umsetzung der Richtlinie
91/440 zur Entwicklung der europäischen Eisenbahnen weit über das von der Richtlinie geforderte
Minimum hinausgehen. In diesem Artikel werden die unterschiedlichen Befunde auf
unterschiedliche Betrachtungsperspektiven des Implementationsprozesses zurückgeführt, die unter
den Etiketten des 'compliance' bzw. des 'support-building' Ansatzes firmieren. Während ersterer auf
die Verordnung nationaler Reformen 'von oben' abstellt, betont letzterer das Bemühen, europäische
Integration durch die Beeinflussng nationaler politischer Arenen voranzutreiben. Erfolgreich sind
derlei Implementationsbestrebungen in dem Maße, in dem es gelingt, auf der nationalen Ebenen
Unterstützung für 'europakonforme' Reformen zu bewirken. In dieser Hinsicht können im
wesentlichen drei Mechanismen zur Beeinflussung nationaler Entscheidungsarenen unterschieden
werden: die Bereitstellung von a) Handlungslegitimität für politische Führung, b) Konzepten für die
Lösung nationaler Probleme und c) die strategische Einengung des Handlungsspielraums von
Reformgegnern. 
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1. Introduction
The process of European integration and policy-making is sometimes rather puzzling. On the one
hand, it is well known and documented that member states are no "star pupils" when it comes to the
implementation of European legislation. In many instances, the transposition and enforcement of
supranational policies at the national level is deficient, with European requirements being either
neglected, resisted, wrongly interpreted or incompletely applied(1). In short, member states tend to
do less than they are supposed to do(2). It therefore comes as no surprise that ineffective
implementation has been identified as one of the most urgent problems which, if not properly
addressed, could call into question the legitimacy and credibility of the integration process(3). 
On the other hand, this overall picture is in sharp contrast to a recent "success story" concerning the
implementation of the Council Directive on the development of the Community's railways(4). What
is striking in this context, is not that the Directive was properly complied with at the national level;
the requirements set out in the European legislation were rather modest and therefore could easily be
integrated into national arrangements without significant efforts. The actual surprise lies in the fact
that many member states went far beyond the minimum required by the European legislation, in fact
doing much more than they were legally obliged to do.
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In the following, we argue that these differing evaluations of implementation success can be traced to
different implementation approaches, which may be termed the compliance approach and the
support-building approach. The compliance approach is characterised by a "top-down" perspective
on implementation. The underlying assumption is that compliance leads to desired outcomes and
therefore should be the indicator for successful implementation. While this conception holds true for
the most part of European legislation, we suggest that the Railways Directive is shaped by a
"bottom-up" logic of support-building. The primary objective of the Directive was not in its
immediate effects emerging from national compliance, but in affecting the political climate at the
national level in order to win support for a European "reform project". Hence, successful
implementation implies to a lesser extent legal and practical compliance with European rules. Rather
successful implementation refers to the extent to which European legislation triggers domestic
changes by stimulating and strengthening support for European reform ideas at the national level.
It is the intention of this paper to point out the specific factors explaining the success of the
support-building approach in the case of the railways. How did European legislation impact upon the
domestic policy-making context? Which mechanisms account for the fact that the member states did
more than they were legally required to do? We argue that the European Directive influenced the
domestic arenas in basically three ways: namely by providing (1) legitimisation for political
leadership, (2) concepts for the solution of national problems, and (3) strategic constraints for
domestic actors opposing domestic reforms. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section Two contrasts the two alternative approaches to
European integration and places the 1991 Railways Directive into this broader context. Section Three
analyses the role of the Directive in supporting railway reforms in Britain, the Netherlands, and
Germany; pointing out the different mechanisms of national support-building by European law.
Section Four draws general conclusions, contrasting the findings for Britain, the Netherlands, and
Germany with the cases of Italy and France, where the Directive so far has had a less far-reaching
impact. 
2
2. The Community's Railways Policy: Integration by
Support-Building
Viewed from a mere compliance perspective, the 1991 Directive on the development of the
Community's railways is a "tiger without teeth"; that is to say, its legal requirements pose hardly any
challenges to the well-established railways policies at the national level. This initial picture, however,
looks quite different when taking a look behind the scenes. Thus, it is not the primary objective of the
Directive to promote integration from a "top-down" perspective, but by stimulating and influencing
domestic reform discussions. In short, the legal mechanism underlying this Directive is quite
different from a traditional approach to legal compliance.
2.1 Compliance versus Support-Building
European legislation, which may emanate from both the policy-making in the Council and the
decisions of the European Court of Justice, traditionally promotes integration in the sense of a
"top-down" perspective. Member states are legally required to refrain from certain activities or to
carry out specific tasks, regardless of domestic peculiarities and conditions. This implies that the
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According to this conception, domestic implementors should have limited discretion to add values,
and instead are supposed to reproduce faithfully statutory designs decided at the supranational level.
In its ideal form, this approach is characterised by policies which are based on a comprehensive
logic, clear objectives and detailed operational specifications in order to avoid misunderstandings
and false interpretations(5). The crucial assumption underlying the "top-down" approach is that
compliance leads to desired outcomes. Hence, compliance is the measure of "successful integration"
and the primary role of European legislation is to produce effective and consistent compliance across
member states. 
The compliance approach of European legislation and policy-making can be observed in areas of
both positive and negative integration. In areas of positive integration, European policies define
positive requirements member states have to fulfil. In the environmental field, for example, European
directives may require member states to abolish their approaches to pollution control or certain policy
instruments in favour of corresponding arrangements defined in European legislation. In areas of
negative integration, European policies are to a lesser extent directed at positive changes at the
national level, but require member states to abolish or refrain from domestic activities which could
distort the functioning of the internal market(6). In short, both positive and negative integration
traditionally operate from a "top-down" perspective, either demanding or prohibiting member states
to carry out certain activities.
This approach is in clear contrast to alternative implementation concepts which emphasise a
"bottom-up" perspective and, more specifically, the building of support for certain projects or ideas.
The support-building approach, which so far played a limited role in the European context, places
greater emphasis on statutes that influence values and participation patterns and how various groups
reconcile their interests(7). From a support-building perspective, European integration is to a lesser
extent related to the national compliance with legal and administrative requirements of supranational
policies. Rather, successful implementation refers to the extent to which European policies contribute
towards creating and improving domestic support for European reform projects and hence trigger
changes at the national level. 
Of course, European legislation may in fact hardly reflect an ideal type version of either a compliance
or support-building approach. In many instances, supranational policies will contain elements of both
concepts. Thus, it is perfectly conceivable that measures following a "top-down" logic, besides their
specific legal impact, will considerably affect the domestic decision-making context, and hence the
overall support for EU legislation. However, we submit that in general one of the two approaches is
dominant. While the greater part of EU policy-making is characterised by the dominance of the
compliance perspective, the Railways Directive serves as a good example for illustrating the
support-building approach. 
2.2 European Legislation as Support Building: The Case of the Railways
In 1991, the Council of Transport Ministers agreed on a Directive on the development of the
Community's railways. Although proposals to liberalise the European railways had been on the
agenda of the Commission since the mid-1970s, it was not before the early 1990s, that supranational
reform efforts were accepted by the member states(8). As we will see, this sudden take-off in
European railways policy can be understood in terms of a changing approach to integration. While
the Commission initially based its reform proposals on a legally demanding compliance approach,
the 1991 Directive emphasises the building of domestic support for railway liberalisation rather than
forcing member states by law to reform their railways.
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Despite the widespread acknowledgement that the European railways faced a profound financial
crisis, the railways policy of the EU for a long time made little progress. Throughout the 1980s,
corresponding legislative attempts of the Commission never surpassed their initial stage. What is
more, the main objectives of the railways policy at that stage - namely to improve the railways'
competitive situation in intermodal competition, and to reduce social service obligations and state
aids for the railways - had not been achieved. Rather, the overall situation of the railways in Europe
had in fact worsened(9).
The reasons for this deadlock in the European railways policy were twofold. On the one hand, there
was a strong resistance at the member state level towards any Community attempt to intervene into
domestic railway policies. Especially in the larger member states, the railways were not seen as
purely economic actors, but as public service which had to be maintained for political reasons. On
the other hand, the Commission disposed of only limited legal and institutional powers in order to
overcome the resistance of the member states. Thus, in contrast to sectors like energy and
telecommunications, the railways, as a result of their strong dependence on national subsidies, could
not easily be made subject to the application of European competition law (article 90 of the Treaty)
which formally empowers the Commission to break up national monopolies without the agreement
of the Council. However, even if the Commission was able to rely on these formal legal powers, the
practice of European policy-making in telecommunications and energy reveals that the de facto
application of article 90 is dependent on the consent of the member states(10).
From the end 1980s onwards, the Commission started a new initiative in order to address the
problems of the railways, given the increasing problems concerning the railways' financial situation
and economic position in intermodal competition with road haulage. Rather than explicitly
demanding that the railways be "trimmed down" into a profitable industry, the Commission
emphasised organisational and regulatory reforms, including managerial autonomy for the railways
from state interference, contracts regulating the financial relationship between the state
administration and the railways, the separation of infrastructure provision and network operation, and
rules governing market access and operation(11). 
Given the above mentioned difficulties for the development of a supranational railways policy, one
could hardly expect that the new concept of the Commission would easily be accepted by the
Council. Indeed, a corresponding proposal by the Commission was watered down by the Council and
the European Parliament(12). An agreement was only possible if the requirements for domestic
compliance were further reduced. 
Consequently, the 1991 Directive contains hardly any serious challenges to the well-established
railway policies of the member states at the domestic level. The Directive is endowed with a
non-compulsory nature and a sufficiently ambiguous texture in order to give domestic implementors
far-reaching flexibility and discretion in the way in which they comply with its modest requirements.
Thus, the most "demanding" requirement of the Directive is that member states shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that the accounts for business relating to the provision of infrastructure
and those for business relating to the provision of transport activities are kept separate. In other
words, the Directive requires only a change in national accounting systems rather than organisational
or institutional adaptations. Moreover, the Directive's provisions for third party track access were
restricted to international joint ventures in freight transport rather than being granted to individual
companies, such as national railways.
In this light, one could hardly expect any progress towards the Commission's reform objectives of a
liberalised European railways market from the mere legal compliance with the Directive's
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compliance approach in this area. Contrary to its initial ambitious objective to reform the domestic
railways system by relying on a "top-down" approach, its intention was to alter the national
policy-making context by increasing the support for its reform programme. As a Commission official
pointed out, "if the Directive was to be a success, it wasn't so much a success with what it did
directly, but what it did indirectly. And that is to create a new thought process to be applied to the
railways, to think again about what railways were supposed to be doing, and how they were supposed
to be run"(13). To this extent, the Commission made a virtue of necessity. Since the political context
provided limited opportunities for the successful application of a compliance approach, the
Commission changed its concept in favour of a "bottom-up" approach to European integration(14).
4
In fact, the impact of this support-building version of European integration at the domestic level
seems to be considerable, as is demonstrated by fundamental railway reforms which have taken place
or are still under way in Britain, the Netherlands, and Germany. While these countries went far
beyond the legal requirements set out in the Directive, reform attempts, albeit more moderate, are
also to be observed in other countries, including those with a classical "statist" tradition like France
and Italy. In the following, we will have a closer look at the particular mechanisms underlying the
support-building approach of the Railways Directive. For this purpose, we will investigate the impact
of the Directive in the three countries which are most advanced with their railway reforms: Britain,
the Netherlands, and Germany.
3. Three Mechanisms of Support-Building
As our analysis of the railway reforms in Britain, the Netherlands, and Germany reveals, there are
three basic ways in which European legislation may increase domestic support for supranational
reform projects. In its "lightest" version, European legislation can provide legitimacy for domestic
political leaders in situations of high uncertainty about outcomes. Domestic leaders hesitate to enact
national reforms, although they potentially possess both concepts of reform and the political power to
push these ideas into practice within the national context. However, support-building role of
European legislation is not restricted to the provision of legitimacy for decisions in situations of
uncertainty, but may also mean that national policy-makers rely on European concepts to solve their
national problems. A final mechanism of European support-building refers to the way European
legislation may strengthen the domestic capacity for reform. In limiting strategic opportunities for
domestic opponents of reform, EU policy may provide support to overcome any institutional veto at
the national level.
3.1 Britain: European Legitimisation for a Domestic "Revolution"
The privatisation of British Rail (BR), which was introduced with the Railways Act 1993, can be
classified without exaggeration as the most radical and far-reaching railway reform anywhere in the
EU. The changes in the formerly publicly-owned railways go beyond European requirements in
several ways. 
First, the separation of infrastructure and network operation is not only restricted to accounting, but is
found in a far-reaching organisational fragmentation. Operational services, including passenger and
freight transport, were split up into over thirty companies. Moreover, they were institutionally
separated from infrastructure provision and maintenance for which a particular company (Railtrack)
was established. Second, the organisational break-up of BR into separate businesses was followed by
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freight transport, services) were sold off to the private sector, and the passenger services were
franchised to private companies. In contrast to all other European countries, the provision and
maintenance of infrastructure was also privatised by stock market flotation. Third, privatisation was
accompanied by the establishment of a liberalised market regime. Whereas for freight operations
access to the market was completely liberalised, a more restricted form of competition was
introduced for the passenger sector. Market access is restricted by a competitive bidding process for
franchises which grant the successful bidder a regional monopoly for a limited period of time. Both
the yearly subsidy payments and the detailed service obligations to be fulfilled by the franchisee are
specified in formal contracts, so-called franchise agreements. Finally, liberalisation coincided with
the establishment of a regulatory framework relying on two independent regulatory agencies. The
Office of the Rail Regulator deals mainly with aspects of competition and monopoly control, i.e. the
classical regulatory functions in order to control privatised industries. The establishment of the
Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF) on the other hand results from the franchising
provisions which reflect a peculiarity of the railway privatisation: that not all passenger operations
are economically profitable and therefore require subsidy payments. OPRAF has the responsibility to
allocate these subsidies(15).
If one considers the history of utility reforms in Britain which both preceded and went beyond
corresponding reform activities at the supranational level, one might hardly expect that supranational
policy-making made any difference with respect to the privatisation of British Rail. However,
although the railways had already been on the "selling list" of the Conservative government since the
early 1980s, railway privatisation was especially problematic in comparison to the other public
utilities, such as gas, telecommunications, electricity and water. Given Britains rich experience of the
privatisation of public utilities and public sector reforms, there was never likely to be a shortage of
reform concepts. Moreover, the generally strong position of executive leaders in Britain provided
significant capacity to push through a radical reform despite considerable opposition. Rather, given
the high level of political and economic uncertainty associated with the specific case of the railways,
European legislation provided an important extra legitimisation for the British government to finally
enact a rather radical reform programme. 
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British Rail: A Difficult Case for Privatisation
In common with the railways of other European countries, BR was highly dependent on public
subsidies and faced an ever increasing loss of market share in freight transport. Despite several
reform attempts during the 1970s, the railways' reputation as an inefficient and inflexible industry
gained increasing political attention in the context of the far-reaching privatisation programme
launched by the Conservative government from 1979 onwards.
However, although the Conservative government maintained a strong commitment to the idea of
privatising BR, the specific problem of the railway industry inhibited the "easy" application of the
standard British solution to the reform of public utilities. In contrast to other public utilities on the
governments "selling list" BR was a loss-making undertaking and dependent on public funding. On
the other hand, the option of making BR more attractive for privatisation by closing unprofitable
lines was never politically feasible, due, in part, to the particular affection of the British public with
respect to their railways(16). 
It was only at the beginning of the 1990s, when potential solutions to tackle the perceived problem of
the railways became available. Policy-makers were able to draw on various experiences stemming
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privatisation of other public-sector industries pointed to the need to liberalise public monopolies
before privatisation and to separate the ownership of infrastructure and network operations(17).
Moreover, in order to cope with the problem of loss-making services, government relied on
experience with franchising, contracting-out and performance regimes introduced in bus deregulation
and general administrative reforms. Indeed, these experiences had a profound impact on the reform
concept finally applied(18).
Once the concept of how to apply a standard solution to the specific case of the railways had been
formulated, there seemed to be nothing to stop British government enacting these reforms. The
Westminster-model generally favours the emergence of strong single-party governments which face
hardly any formal or actual institutional veto when pursuing their objectives. "Britain has the fastest
law in the West, with the fewest formal or codified restrictions on government action of any liberal
democracy"(19). However, things were not as easy as the above seems to suggest, the main reason
for this being the high degree of political uncertainty associated with the railways reform. Given the
mixture of several recipes applied to the privatisation of BR, the reform had a rather experimental
character, and hence presented considerable political risks for British policy-makers.
European Legislation: Legitimisation for a Radical Decision under Uncertainty
The political uncertainties associated with railway reform became apparent in several aspects. First, it
was highly questionable whether the franchise system would work as intended. Many commentators
presumed that franchisees would strive to cut costs by reductions in services. Given the fact that the
franchisees would be able to influence only 20% of their costs with the other 80% being determined
by charges for rolling stock and track access, there might be only limited room for the efficiency
gains the government hoped for. Second, there was high uncertainty as to whether the regulatory
regime would be appropriate in order to secure sufficient investment by the private infrastructure
monopoly (Railtrack). Third, it was argued that there were important economies of scope stemming
from a vertically-integrated structure which would facilitate investment. These advantages would be
lost within a fragmented industry structure. Important transaction costs originate from the allocation
of economic risks related to infrastructure investment between different actors involved. Thus, in
every single case it would be necessary to clarify who should pay for track upgrading; i.e. Railtrack,
or the operator who wants new tracks to be built(20).
Against this background of high political uncertainty about the outcomes of a radical and
experimental reform programme, the 1991 Railways Directive played an important role in providing
domestic political leaders with extra legitimisation for their reform plans. In contrast to many other
European countries, problems of railway reform were neither related to a lacking problem-solving
philosophy nor to limited capacity for putting this philosophy into practice, given the strong role for
integrated leadership within the British political system. Rather the difficulty of the railway reform
was its radical and experimental character, which created considerable uncertainty and risk for
political leaders. Thus, the 1991 Directive provided an important resource for the government to
legitimate its risky undertaking: ”The directive was preparing the way for what we would like to do
anyway”(21). To conclude, although the British reforms went far beyond the legal requirements set
out in the Directive, the latter served as added legitimisation for implementing a radical reform which
had the blessing from Brussels.
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3.2 The Netherlands: An European Model for Domestic Problems
7 von 18 29.05.98 12:06
EIoP: Text 1998-003: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-003.htmAlthough the 1996 reform of the Dutch railways did not follow the path of liberalisation and
commercialisation taken in Britain, it went beyond the requirements of the Railway Directive, and,
moreover, assumed elements characteristic of the Netherlands. At the heart of the railway reform in
the Netherlands lies the disentanglement of public and private functions and responsibilities. In
institutional terms, this means a vertical and horizontal separation of functions with each segment
embedded within a regulatory framework appropriate to its politically-assigned function. On the one
hand, all infrastructure-related tasksincluding licensing, access regulation and infrastructure
buildingare assigned to a government-commissioned sector to reinforce their public character and to
ensure governmental influence for reasons of co-ordination. On the other hand, the horizontal
separation of operations has been regarded as a precondition to set the agenda for competition.
Provided with increased managerial autonomy and financially put on an even keel, the main services
of the Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS)passenger and freight transportare now, though to a different
degree, subject to competition. In the freight sector, there has been an uncompromised market
approach which provided NS Cargo with the greatest possible freedom. In this respect, rail freight is
on the same private footing as any road freight company. Due to the sector's high political saliency,
competition in the rail passenger market was not introduced immediately, but took place in a
typically Dutch way, i.e. limited and guided.(22) Nevertheless, the relation between the government
and the NS was transformed in such a way as to increase significantly the independence of the
company and to cut back drastically on the opportunities for government intervention in its
management. Whereas in government has for a long time instrumentalised the NS for certain
redistributive objectives, the NS now requires renumeration for all such benefits from the Ministry of
Transport or any other public entity.
The reform of the railways fits in well with the recent history of successful reform programmes in the
Netherlands. Without doubt, the reform of the welfare state reform Netherlands provides the most
significant example of the Dutch style of policy-making. Macro-economic concertation of
socio-economic actors as well as concertation at the sectoral level generated a climate of consensual
decision-making. Institutionalised forms of public-private interactions guaranteed a high capacity to
adjust politically to economic change.(23) However, it has frequently been shown that to initiate and
guide reform processes requires the 'shadow of hierarchy', i.e. government acted as primus inter
pares and had to claim public authority.(24) An additional strengthening of public authority
frequently occurs by referring to the process of European integration and requirements to adapt
(pro-acitively) to European policies. Both the provision of legitimation for public actors and the
orientation function of European policies could be observed during the reform of the railways. Faced
with a failure of existing regulation, Dutch government adopted a reform model that was proposed by
European legislation. This model not only increased the governments legitimacy to act, but also
provided a concept which contributed to solve existing problems at the domestic level by corporatist
negotiations between public and private action.
Domestic problems...
In the Netherlands, the NS, a state-owned public limited liability company, operated as a kind of
nation-wide undertaking for passenger transport by rail. Subject to a number of public service
obligations, the NS relied strongly on public subsidies. In contrast to passenger transport, freight
transport was considered to be a 'by-product' which had to operate on a strictly commercial basis.(25)
However, from the mid 1980s onwards the existing regulation was challenged by several factors.
First, to maintain or even to improve passenger transport services required ever-increasing financial
support. Apart from fiscal considerations related to passenger transport, efforts to revitalise freight
transport by rail were to a large extent due to pressure that stemmed from economic and social actors.
On the one hand, road transport, which had developed as the backbone of the Dutch transport
industry, was faced with increasing problems of congestion and bottlenecks. These limitations of the
existing infrastructure were perceived as a threat to the competitive position of the Dutch
economy.(26) On the other hand, in a general atmosphere of growing environmental consciousness,
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on political actors. 
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Given this set of problems, a broad consensus towards a strengthening of the railways emerged
between political, societal and economic actors. In 1989, the report 'Strategy for Freight Transport by
Rail' of the so-called 'van der Plas Commission' marked a crucial point in Dutch railway policy. The
report made a gloomy forecast concerning the competitive position of the Port of Rotterdam and the
development of the railways in future. The lack of a high quality railway system to provide an
alternative to road transport would be 'disastrous' and a 'serious handicap for the Netherlands as a
gateway to Europe'. While the NS made the most of the pro-rail support and offered bold
re-organisation plans which would have left the NS as a integrative unit, the government followed
the recommendations of a second committee which laid the foundation for a general restructuring of
the Dutch railways. In 1992, the report submitted by the 'Wijffels Committee' made concrete
recommendations for a future organisation of the railways. Referring to European legislation
(91/440) the report recommended a vertical and horizontal splitting up of different railway units and,
furthermore, asked for a clear and coherent transport policy. 
... meet an European solution
The history of the reform underlines the broad consensus among political, economic and societal
actors in favour of a strengthening of the railways. Given these pressures and the awareness that road
transport alone would not be able to cope with an ever-increasing volume of freight transport, the
government started to revise its policies from the mid-1980s. The major feature of the new
policy-making approach was the strife to take the interdependence and interaction of different modes
of transport, i.e. road, rail, inland waterways, more into account.(27) This approach rested on two
pillars. On the one hand, co-ordination became a major theme of an approach striving for an
integration of different sub-systems views. On the other hand, deregulation and the introduction of
the market principle wherever possible was seen as important means of increasing the
competitiveness of Dutch industry. From the mid 1980s onwards, government had already proved its
capacity to realise its policy visions in road freight transport. According to the generally
institutionalised modus operandi of consensual and negotiated problem-solving, government,
together with the road hauliers interest organisation, had succeeded in developing a scheme which
contained elements of industrial policies within a liberal and deregulated market regime. 
The developement of a comprehensive solution for the railways was hampered by the integration of
passenger and freight transport into the same organisation and their dependence on the same
infrastructure. However, with the added legitimacy of the European legislation, the government was
able to draw strength from the European policy. Most importantly, the model proposed by EC
Directive 91/440 entailed the splitting up of the railways complex and problematic structure, and
thereby allowed policy-makers to deal with specific problems sequentially. Thus, the European
legislation fitted well with the emerging Dutch approach of integrated transport policy-making as the
provisions enshrined in the regulation left sufficient room for the government to incorporate its own
policy views whilst transforming the provisions into national legislation.
While in the past, the government, receptive to the high level of public suport for a pro-rail transport
policy, had been willing to accept the NS's own proposals for reform, in 1992 the government
rejected proposals which involved a cautious step topwards organisation separation without
destroying the structural integrity of the railways in favour of the more radical scheme proposed by
the Wijffels Committee. The Wijffels' recommendations did not only incorporate the European
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transport markets, i.e. to establish the market principle wherever possible while maintaining
governments prerogative to intervene where necessary. The advent of a Common European Railway
Policy, which will be built on the pillars of the separation of infrastructure and operations on the one
hand and the introduction of market-conform means on the other, legitimised the governments
position. In a nutshell, European legislation served not only as a concept to solve domestic problems,
but also provided political executives with additional legitimacy to enact its policy ideas. 
3.3 The Reform of the German Railways: Restricting Opposition
At first glance, the reform of the German railways of 1994 seems to be nothing more than a formal
privatisation, as a public monopoly was transformed into a private one. Nevertheless, the reform not
only implemented European legislation but went beyond its minimum requirements: by transforming
the railways into a joint-stock company (Deutsche Bahn Aktiengesellschaft DB AG); by separating
infrastructure and operations in organisational termsand providing a schedule for the institutional
separation of the exploitation of infrastructure and freight and passenger operations within a ten years
period; and, finally, by opening up the rail infrastructure to any national and foreign railway
undertaking on the basis of the principle of mutual reciprocity, i.e. provided that the network of the
foreign company is also accessible to German operators.(28) Further important elements of the
reform were: a distinction between sovereign authority, exercised by newly formed administrations
responsible for licensing and control, and commercial operations; the merger of Deutsche
Bundesbahn and Deutsche Reichsbahn; regionalisation, i.e. the shift of responsibility for regional
public transport to the Länder as of January 1996; and a fundamental release from the debts of DB
AG.
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The extent of the reform comes as a surprise when one takes into account that 'semi-sovereign'
policy-making and a tendency towards administrative conservatism made Germany the backwater of
administratitive modernisation, privatisation and reform during the 1970s and 1980s.(29) Generally,
policy-making in Germany is characterised by the fragmention of power and the existence of formal
or de facto powers of veto. However, German re-unification and European integration contributed to
a significant change. On the one hand, problems related to the re-unification prevented incremental
policy-making. On the other hand, European policies provided government not only with additional
legitimacy, but also with the conceptual framework which can be enacted at the national level. Thus,
European provisions limit the scope for potential opponents at the national level. 
Internal and external pressure
The Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB) was constituted as a national railway but was required to act as 'an
economic enterprise' which fulfils 'public service obligations' (Art 28 I of the Federal Railway Act).
To impose such seemingly contradictory obligations on the railways was the result of what one might
call a 'national embrace' involving Federal government, parliament, Länder, trade unions and industry
which all took part in railway policy-making.(30) The legal-budgetary regime, whereby the railway
constituted a special Federal fund without independent legal personality (nicht-rechtsfähiges
Sondervermögen), helped to act as a buffer for the inherent conflict of objectives in the railway's
constitution. Thus, the costs resulting from efforts to fulfil conflicting goals built up as deficits in the
special Federal fund outside the main Federal budget.
From the mid 1980s onwards, the negative consequences of the existing regulations were becoming
increasingly apparent. The continuous decline of the railways was forcing the Federal government to
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greater costs as a result of the unsatisfactory state of public transport by road and rail at regional and
local level; the railway unions could not prevent the steady decline in jobs; and, finally, transport
exports and leading business associations questioned the basic justification for the existing regulation
of transport markets in Germany and argued for deregulation and liberalisation policies. These
factors combined to stimulate the emergence of a basic parliamentary consensus between the
governing Centre-Liberal coalition and the opposition Social Democrats. 
In 1989, a commission (Regierungskommission Bahn) was launched with the brief to develop
proposals for establishing a sustainable basis for the railways. In its work, the commission was
substantially affected by two developments: the German unification, coupled with the opening up of
Eastern Europe; and the obligations imposed by the European legislation. As a result of the first, the
commission had not only to take into account the calamitous financial situation of the Deutsche
Bundesbahn and the Deutsche Reichsbahn, but also the latter's specific problems and the fact that
Germany was supposed to become a transit country in the centre of Europe. Against this background,
the commission's final report, published in December 1991, recommended a fundamental structural
reform which, at that time, represented the most radical approach to the reorganisation of the
railways. On the basis of these recommendations, the Federal Government decided to institute a
structural reform of the German railways to come into effect on 1 January 1994.
Constraining veto players
There is good evidence to state that only the combination of internal and external factors can
satisfactorily explain both the speed and substance of the reform. On the one hand, in the late 1980s,
a broad consensus between political and economic actors emerged demanding a substantial reform of
the regulations in the transport sector. German re-unification and the need to implement relevant
European legislation urged the demand for finding a solution. Given the nature of the problem, the
relatively modest demands of European provisions fell on fertile ground and could develop its
potential in a threefold manner. 
First, the advisory commission working on the future development of the German railways
incorporated the concept inherent in the provisions of the EC-Directive 91/440 into
recommendations which proposed the most far-reaching reform in the history of the German
railways. To separate vertical and horizontal respect not only allows for increasing the internal
transparency of different functions, tasks and servicesan aspect which was especially important with
respect to regional and local passenger transportbut also includes the introduction of intra-modal
competition as a market-based means of increasing efficiency. Second, the 'aura' of future European
requirements increased the legitimacy of the Federal Government to implement its neo-liberal
inspired ideas of restructuring the regulation of transport markets.
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Third, a final important effect of the European legislation on the situation at the nation level was its
impact on potential opponents of the reform. As the reform included an amendment of Article 87 of
the Basic Law, the Federal Government needed not only the agreement of the opposition SPD MPs in
the Bundestag, but also the confirmation of the Länder in the Bundesrat. While all former efforts to
reform the railways had substantially been opposed, either by the Länder which did not want to
accept regionalisation or by the railwaymen's union which successfully mobilised Social Democrats
in Parliament, the new European legislation decisively changed the situation. The European
provisionsand even more so the original proposals of the European Commissionclearly indicated the
direction in which the future railway policy was supposed to develop. Hence, the fact that the reform
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significantly constrained the ability of potential opponents to resist the reform. Given the foreseeable
developments, the question for potential veto players, especially the Länder, the opposition in
parliament and the railway union, was not how to block the general developments but how best to
influence the shape of the reform which almost inevitably would develop into a new direction.
Hence, although several actors at the national level forced the Ministry of Transport into extensive
concessions,(31) the reform of the German railways constitutes a third case illustrating the impact of
the European legislation on the national constellation. It not only provided government with
additional legitimisation and a conceptual framework for solving domestic problems, but also
restricted the resources of potential opposition. 
4. Conclusion: The Scope of Support-Building
We have seen that the railway reforms in Britain, the Netherlands, and Germany went well beyond
the legal compliance requirements of the 1991 Railways Directive. This finding is in sharp contrast
to the overall picture of European implementation deficits. In our analysis, we have tried to explain
these differences in implementation success by emphasising that the 1991 Railways Directive follows
an alternative route of legal integration. Contrary to the classical and dominant "top-down" approach
to integration, where compliance at the national level indicates successful implementation, the
Railways Directive follows the logic of support-building. 
It is a crucial characteristic of the support-building approach that its success is highly dependent on
the specific conditions which shape policy-making at the national level. Domestic conditions define
the need for European support. As demonstrated by our three "success stories", this need varies
strongly between countries. Hence, in each country different mechanisms of support-building were of
importance. Despite this variance of domestic needs for external support, European legislation still
provided sufficient support to trigger domestic reforms. However, this cannot be taken for granted, as
suggested by the limited impact of EU legislation in France and Italy. In these countries the demand
for external support exceeded what could be provided by European legislation. Its dependence upon
national conditions therefore implies considerable limits for the success of the support-building
approach. Notwithstanding these domestic constraints, however, the support-building approach also
in these countries may pave the way for a more liberal regime, especially when it is supplemented
with subsequent "top-down" legislation at the supranational level.
4.1 The Domestic Need for European Support: Three Mechanisms
As our three country studies demonstrate, the effects of support-building played a crucial role in
facilitating domestic railway reforms that come closer to the general project of an internal railways
market as one could have expected from the modest requirements set out in the Directive. Given the
far-reaching reforms in Britain, the Netherlands, and Germany, it was our intention to identify the
specific mechanisms by which European legislation affected the domestic decision-making context.
Our cases allow for three general conclusions in this respect. 
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1. There are basically three mechanisms, by which European policies may stimulate and facilitate
domestic reforms. First, European policies may provide additional legitimisation for domestic
political leaders to justify the content and implementation of national reform policies. Second,
European policies can support domestic changes by providing the conceptual basis for reform
to solve specific domestic problems. Third, European legislation can strengthen the potential of
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decision-making process. In doing so, EU legislation formally or factually restricts the strategic
opportunities for domestic reform opponents. 
2. We have seen that the extent to which these mechanisms are of relevance in order to bring
about domestic reforms depends on the specific political and institutional conditions at the
national level. Thus, from the three countries under study, the need for European support was
lowest in the British case. British reformers neither lacked an adequate conceptual basis for
their reforms nor the institutional and political capacity to put through the radical reform
programme. However, given the experimental character of the reform, EU legislation played an
important role in legitimising the final decision in a situation of high political uncertainty. In
the Dutch case, by contrast, European legitimisation would not have been sufficient to
stimulate successfully the railway reform. Notwithstanding the institutionalised system of
corporate conflict resolution, which accounts for a generally high level of national reform
capacity, the Dutch for a long time had not been able to develop an appropriate solution for the
well-acknowledged problems of their railways. In this situation, the concept of reform
embodied in the 1991 Directive played an important role in providing the basis for the
development of an appropriate solution to the problems of the Dutch railways. The need for
European support was even higher in the German case, where policy-makers the Directive did
not only provide them with additional European legitimisation and a conceptual framework to
solve problems. Domestic reforms were also facilitated by the fact that European policy
restricted the strategic opportunities of domestic reform opponents, and hence reduced the
difficulties to reach an agreement in the context the numerous veto points provided by the
fragmented German polity. 
Table 1: Mechanisms of Support-Building in Three Countries 
Mechanism / Country Britain Netherlands Germany
Legitimisation X X X
Conceptual Basis   X  X
Restricting Strategic Opportunities 
for Reform Opponents     X
3. Although the railway reforms in the three countries under study are well in line with the
Commission's project of railway liberalisation, they reveal far-reaching differences with
respect to their concrete regulatory and organisational arrangements. These differences are to
be understood against the background of differing national conditions, problem perceptions
and regulatory traditions. The particular success of the "bottom-up" logic embodied in the
Railways Directive therefore may be seen in its role in stimulating domestic reforms which are
sufficiently similar to correspond to European reform ideas, but leave sufficient room for
taking account of national diversity. 
4.2 Domestic Limits to Successful Support-Building: Evidence from France and
Italy
Notwithstanding the far-reaching impact on European legislation in Britain, the Netherlands, and
Germany, it should not be overlooked, however, that the support-building approach may not be
universally successful in every member state. This qualification refers to the fact that the national
context not only defines the need for European support but also implies important limits for the
success of the support-building approach. The impact of this qualification becomes obvious when
this need is too high to be sufficiently compensated by European support, as demonstrated by the
cases of France and Italy.
Relating the mechanisms of the support-building approach to their impact on the national level in
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follows: United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, France and Italy. While, in the German case,
support by legitimation, conceptualisation and constraint of opposition proved still sufficient to
generate a significant reform, this has obviously not been the case in France and Italy. The question
is: what are the limits of the support-building approach? 
11
Turning to the French case first, it seems as if European provisions may have supplied some support.
In 1997, a new organisation was created which is in charge of the infrastructure (Réseau ferré de
France, RFF). This may support the impression that European legislation provided political
leadership with legitimisation and conceptual back-up, and contributes to influencing actors at the
national level in favour of a reform in line with the European ideas. However, the fact that the SNCF
still manages infrastructure on behalf of RFF and that the monopoly of SNCF for all operational
services is maintained contradicts this impression. Rather, we encounter a catch-22 situation that the
administration is faced with. On the one hand, French administration is quite responsive to European
policies which offer the conceptual means of solving some of the problems of the railways. On the
other hand, the possibilities of the administration to act according to its convictions and to apply the
European concept of reform is limited by two factors; hence restricting the scope of the
support-approach in the case of the French railways. 
First, given the general ”rationality” of a ”strong state”, the opportunities to legitimate political
changes by reference to European requirements are fairly restricted. Especially in politically rather
sensitive areas, such as agriculture or transport characterised by string and influential societal actors,
the legitimisation of domestic reforms by European legislation is likely to have the paradoxical effect
of even increasing political opposition. Opposing actors, in many instances, can mobilise additional
support by emphasising the political weakness of the ”strong French state” when voluntarily
accepting European requirements. Thus, as demonstrated by French railways policy, any reliance on a
legitimacy based on European provisions further increased the resistance of societal actorsespecially
the railway unionsagainst the reform. As a consequence, the impact of legitimisation mechanism of
European support-building is limited in France. Second, and closely related to this aspect, European
provisions do not sufficiently constrain the opponents of reform. Contrary to the situation in
Germany, where potential veto players interpreted European developments in a way that favoured
their cooperation rather than resistance to the railway reform, opposing actors in France even gain
new opportunities to mobilise political resistance when pointing to the European dimension
underlying domestic reform attempts. European support-building in the French case was therefore
restricted to the provision of reform concepts which were generally accepted within the French
administration. However, European legislation so far did not provide sufficient support, in terms of
both political legitimisation and the reduction of strategic opportunities for reform opponents, to
allow the administration to fully enact these reforms in the context of strong political and societal
opposition. Rather, the French railway reform so far can be characterised as a ”tightrope walk”
between officially opposing European activities and cautiously introducing domestic reforms which
are in line with European policy objectives(32). 
The reform of the Italian Ferrovie dello Stato illustrates the limits of the support-building mechanism
in a different way. In contrast to the French case, Italian political leaders are generally quite willing to
rely on European reform proposals and to legitimise domestic reforms by pointing to European
requirements. In many instances, Europe is seen as the only means to overcome national deadlocks
which emerge from the fragmented political decision-making structures in Italy, offering opposing
actors numerous veto opportunities to block or weaken domestic changes. Although the conceptual
basis of the European railways policy has been actively used by Italian leaders to promote and
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legislation was not sufficient to trigger substantial changes.
Thus, the 1992 privatisation of the Italian railways, which was itself preceeded by other reform
attempts from 1985 onwards, remained largely at a formal and symbolic stage. Despite the new
structure, changes occurred neither with respect to the scope of governmental interference into the
management of the railways, nor in subjecting passenger and frieght operations to a more
competitive framework. A similar failure was the so-called Prodi Directive of 1997 which suggested
a far-reaching railway reform (by relying on European legitimisation and conceptualisation). Given
the broad resistence to the proposals (especially from the railway unions), it was relegated into a
long-term policy plan. In contrast to Germany, European support was not sufficient to overcome
strong resistance of domestic veto players(33). The Italian case thus demonstrates the limits of
support-building in cases where domestic opposition to European reform projects holds a strong
position in the national decision-making context.
4.3 Support-Building and Compliance: Complementary Approaches
It is a basic characteristic of the support-building approach that it promotes European integration by
accommodating national diversity. Rather than being directed at prescribing domestic reforms "from
above", the provision of European support aims at triggering European integration within the existing
political context at the national level. We have seen that this strategy has its strengths and
weaknesses. On the one hand, as illustrated by the cases of Germany, the Netherlands, and Britain,
the strong reliance on the domestic context can be rather successful, assuming that European support
falls on a sufficiently fertile ground, and hence contributes to far-reaching domestic changes. On the
other hand, its explicit reliance on the domestic context can significantly reduce the scope of the
support-building approach in cases where the domestic conditions are not sufficiently responsive to
European influence.
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However, this weakness of the support-building approach may be seen as less severe, when its effects
are interpreted within a broader perspective. To be precise, support-building can be interpreted as a
starting point which paves the way for further dynamics of European integration. In this respect, two
aspects have to be distinguished:
First, support-building can prepare European market integration by setting in motion a self-dynamic
of market mechanisms pushing towards liberalisation. Thus, it is conceivable that the liberalisation of
the railways sector which took place so far in Germany, the Netherlands, and Britain will create
spill-over effects increasing the pressure towards similar reforms in France and Italy. The French
Companie Géneral d'Enterprise Automobile, which operates local passenger transport by rail not
only in France but also in the Netherlands, Britain, Germany and Portugal represents a clear signal
for an Europeanisation of the supply-side of railway serviceseven though the French railway reform
up to now was only quite limited.
Second, support-building may prepare the ground for subsequent measures of "top-down"
integration. In generating market dynamics in some countries, support-building contributes to the
emergence of new actors, such as the privatised railway operators, which might serve as coalition
partners for the European Commission not only at the domestic but also at the supranational level.
Thus, privatised industries, in striving for network access in other, less liberalised countries, might
address the Commission or the European Court of Justice to push through their demands. So doing,
they contribute to an expansion of the up to then restricted scope for authoritarian mechanisms, e.g.
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competition might contribute to the emergence of market mechanisms, which, in turn, prepare the
ground for the application of the top-down approach to integration. This way, the compliance and the
support-building approach are not in contradiction with each other, but - appropriately combined -
can compensate their mutual weaknesses in order to promote European integration.
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